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  • Ethnicity, Etnologia i antropologia, Antropologia polityczna

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    New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies
    3, 1 (June, 2001): 34-48.
    ETHNICITY AND EARNINGS DETERMINATION
    IN URBAN CHINA
    ZANG XIAOWEI
    City University of Hong Kong
    LI LULU
    Renmin University
    The decade of the 1990s witnessed a burst of scholarly publications in the
    West on ethnic minorities in China, most of which deal with issues such as
    relations between Han Chinese and minority peoples, ethnic identity, minority
    cultures and traditions, and the like.
    1
    To some extent, this scholarly interest in
    minority peoples in China was inspired by the importance of the ethnic factor
    in the breakdown of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the potential scenario for
    ethnic conflict and separatism in China.
    2
    Indeed, ethnicity may be easily
    Zang Xiaowei (SSXZ@cityu.edu.hk) teaches Sociology at the City University Of Hong Kong
    and is the author of
    Children of the Cultural Revolution
    (Westview, 2000). Li Lulu is Professor
    and Head of the Department of Sociology at the People's University in Beijing, China.
    1
    Nicole Constable,
    Guest People: Hakka Identity in China and Abroad
    (Seattle: University
    of Washington Press, 1996); Wolfram Eberhard,
    China’s Minorities: Yesterday and Today
    (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1982); Dru C. Gladney,
    Muslim Chinese:
    Ethnic Nationalism in the People’s Republic
    (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996);
    Awelkhan Hali, Zengxiang Li, and Karl W. Luckert,
    Kazakh Traditions of China
    (Lanham,
    Maryland: University Press of America, 1998); Mette Halskov Hansen,
    Lessons in Being
    Chinese: Minority Education and Ethnic Identity in Southwest China
    (Seattle: University of
    Washington Press, 1998); Stevan Harrell (ed.),
    Cultural Encounters in China’s Ethnic
    Frontiers
    (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1995); Thomas Heberer,
    China and Its
    National Minorities: Autonomy or Assimilation?
    (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1989); Colin
    Mackerras,
    China’s Minority Cultures: Identities and Integration since 1912
    (Melbourne:
    Longman, 1995); Lucien Pye, “China: Ethnic Minorities and National Security.” pp. 489-
    512 in Nathan Glazer and Daniel P. Moynihan (eds.):
    Ethnicity: Theory and Experience
    (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Justin Jon Rudelson,
    Oasis Identities:
    Uyghur Nationalism along China’s Silk Road
    (New York: Columbia University Press,
    1997); David Wu, “Chinese Minority Policy and the Meaning of Minority Culture: The
    Example of Bai in Yunnan, China.”
    Human Organization
    49/1 (1990): pp. 1-13; Shifu
    Zhang and David Wu, “Ethnic Conflict and Unity: Examples of Conflict Management in
    Four Minority Groups in Yunnan, China.” pp. 80-90 in J. D. Boucher, D. Landis and K.
    Arnold (eds.),
    Inter-Ethnic Conflict: An International Perspective
    (Beverly Hills: Sage,
    1987).
    2
    Colin Mackerras,
    China’s Minorities: Integration and Modernization in the Twentieth
    Century
    (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1994): p. 3; Dru C. Gladney,
    Ethnic Identity
    in China
    (Fort Worth, Harcourt Beace College Publishers, 1998): pp. 170-171; Heberer,
    China and Its National Minorities
    , pp. 1, 6-7; George and Spindler Louise Spindler,
    “Forward.” pp. vi-vii in Dru C. Gladney,
    Ethnic Identity in China
    (Fort Worth, Harcourt
    Ethnicity and Earnings
    35
    transformed into nationalism and thus become a destabilizing political force
    capable of breaking down a multi-ethnic country.
    3
    Nevertheless, this
    transformation is contingent upon many factors, one of which is inter-ethnic
    inequality, an under-researched topic in China studies.
    4
    As Emily Hannum
    and Yu Xie point out, research on market reforms and social stratification in
    China has paid little attention to China’s ethnic minorities.
    5
    As a matter of
    fact, ethnicity has not been used as a control variable in the existing literature
    on social stratification in China.
    6
    Relying on a data set (n = 1,532) collected in
    Beijing in 1998, we analyze major factors of income inequality by ethnicity in
    China.
    In this research, we examine earnings determination mechanisms for
    Han Chinese and members of ethnic minorities respectively, seeking to
    understand factors of income inequality by ethnicity in urban China during the
    1990s. In the following, we first briefly discuss general information on ethnic
    minorities in China. We then review the literature on ethnic inequality in
    China, using it as a reference point for our research. Next, we discuss our data
    and variables and conduct analysis. Finally, we summarise our research
    findings and propose possible scenarios on ethnic stratification in urban China.
    For convenience, we use ethnic nationalities and minorities interchangeably in
    this research.
    Beace College Publishers, 1998): p. vi; also see Kumar Rupesinghe, Peter King and Olga
    Vorkunova,
    Ethnicity and Conflict in A Post-Communist World: The Soviet Union, Eastern
    Europe, and China
    (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillian, 1992).
    3
    Craig Calhoun, “Nationalism and Ethnicity.”
    Annual Review of Sociology
    19 (1993): pp.
    211-239.
    4
    Joseph Boskin,
    Urban Racial Violence in the Twentieth Century
    (Beverly Hills, Glencoe
    Press, 1976); F. R. Harris and R, W, Wilkins, (eds.)
    Quite Riots: Race and Poverty in the
    United States
    (New York: Pantheon, 1988); also see Susan Olzak, Suzanne Shanahan, and
    Elizabeth H. McEneaney, “Poverty, Segregation, and Race Riots: 1960 to 1993.”
    American
    Sociological Review
    61/4 (1996): pp. 590-613.
    5
    Emily Hannum and Yu Xie, “Ethnic Stratification in Northwest China: Occupational
    Differences between Han Chinese and National Minorities in Xinjiang, 1982-1990.”
    Demography
    , 35/3 (1998): pp. 323-333, p. 323.
    6
    See Yanjie Bian,
    Work and Inequality in Urban China
    (Albany: State University of New
    York Press, 1994); Yanjie Bian, “Bringing Strong Ties Back In.”
    American Sociological
    Review
    62/3 (1997): pp. 366-385; Yanjie Bian and John Logan, “Market Transition and
    Income Inequality in Urban China.”
    American Sociological Review
    61/5 (1996): pp. 739-
    758; Barbara Entwisle, Gail E. Henderson, Susan E. Short, Jill Bouma, and Zhai Fengying,
    “Gender and Family Businesses in Rural China.”
    American Sociological Review
    60/1
    (1995): pp.36-57; Victor Nee, “A Theory of Market Transition: From Redistribution to
    Markets in State Socialism.”
    American Sociological Review
    54/5 (1989): pp. 663-681;
    Victor Nee, “Social Inequalities in Reforming State Socialism.”
    American Sociological
    Review
    56/3 (1991): pp. 267-282; Andrew Walder, “Property Rights and Stratification in
    Socialist Redistributive Economies.”
    American Sociological Review
    57/4 (1992): pp. 524-
    539; Andrew Walder, “Career Mobility and the Communist Political Order.”
    American
    Sociological Review
    60/3(1995): pp. 309-328; Xie Yu and Emily Hannum, “Regional
    Variation in Earning Inequality in Reform-Era Urban China.”
    American Journal of
    Sociology
    101/4 (1996): pp. 950-992; Xueguang Zhou, Nancy Brandon Tuma, and Phyllis
    Moen, “Institutional Change and Job-Shift Patterns in Urban China, 1949 to 1994.”
    American Sociological Review
    62/3 (1997): pp. 393-365.
    Zhang and Li
    36
    Ethnic Minorities in China
    The People’s Republic of China proclaims itself a multinational state and is
    viewed as such internationally. According to the 1990 census, the Han
    nationality comprised 92 per cent of China’s total population. The fifty-five
    officially recognized minority nationalities have a combined population of 91.2
    million, scattered through 50 to 60 percent of the border areas which are most
    important to China in terms of national security. Minority areas are rich in
    natural resources, including 39.3 per cent of China’s forest area and 89.6 per
    cent of China’s pastureland. These areas also produce numerous minerals
    such as iron, manganese, copper, lead, gold, and silver.
    7
    Who are the recognized ethnic nationalities in China? In other words,
    how is ethnic nationality status identified and recognized? In China, ethnicity
    is officially determined and imposed by the central government. During the
    early 1950s, more than four hundred self-proclaimed ethnic groups submitted
    their applications to the central government for official recognition of their
    minority status. By 1957 the central government had recorded over twenty
    nationalities. Through further identification procedures, in 1979 the
    government determined that there were fifty-five minorities, which, with the
    majority Han, made altogether fifty-six nationalities in China. In 1990 officials
    from the State Nationalities’ Affairs Commission informed a foreign observer
    that they considered the work of identifying nationalities virtually complete
    and were unlikely to accept any of the outstanding claims.
    8
    State recognition of ethnicity matters a lot in China. As Dru C. Gladney
    points out, ethnic identity is not just something one maintains about oneself,
    which is open to debate, self-definition, and other-definition; rather, it is a right
    one possesses, legislated and enforced by the state, marked in one’s passport,
    and determined at birth or at nationality registration in the case of mixed
    parentage. One may regard oneself as a member of an ethnic group, but
    unless that group is recognized as a minority nationality by the state, one is
    denied the privileges accorded to certain minorities, such as the allowance to
    have more than one child. Conversely, even if one does not regard oneself as
    ethnic, but is a member of a nationality designated by the state, one has no
    choice but to carry his or her unwanted ethnic identity in all official capacity.
    By giving ethnicity state authority, the government establishes itself as a
    benefactor and teacher of the “backward” minority peoples, who should
    eventually “evolve” and assimilate, with appropriate support and leadership
    provided by the Chinese Communist Party.
    9
    Despite the state’s tyranny in defining ethnicity, the Chinese
    government has since 1949 committed itself to protecting and promoting
    7
    Mackerras,
    China’s Minorities
    , p. 198.
    8
    Fei Xiaotong, “Ethnic Identification in China.” pp. 60-77 in Fei Xiaotong (ed.),
    Toward A
    People’s Anthropology
    (Beijing: New World Press, 1981), p. 60; Heberer
    China and Its
    National Minorities
    , pp. 34-35; Li Honglei, et al.,
    Nationality Work in Contemporary China
    (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1993), pp. 87-88; Mackerras,
    China’s Minorities
    ,
    pp. 142-143; Wu, “Chinese Minority Policy”, pp. 1-2.
    9
    Dru Gladney, “Economy and Ethnicity.” pp. 242-266 in Andrew Walder (ed.)
    The
    Waning of the Communist State
    (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), pp. 262-
    263; Gladney,
    Ethnic Identity in China
    , p. 48.
    Ethnicity and Earnings
    37
    minorities’ rights and cultural heritages, both materially and symbolically. The
    government’s affirmative action policy has been largely motivated by its desire
    to promote inter-ethnic peace, maintain political stability, and preserve
    territorial integrity. The exception occurred during the Cultural Revolution of
    1966-1976 when certain ethnic groups such as Mongolians were persecuted.
    These wrongs were quietly corrected after 1976.
    10
    The government protection of minorities’ rights has mainly been
    reflected in an ethnic entitlement policy that has given minority nationalities
    preferential consideration in college admission quotas, job placement, and
    leadership representation. For example, in the 1980s, the government in the
    Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region instituted an entitlement policy to include
    not only government positions but also jobs in higher education. It also
    decreed that minorities must comprise at least 25 per cent of every college
    entrance class in the region.
    11
    Similarly, after 1979, the Han majority has been subject to the one-child
    birth control policy, while the fertility patterns of ethnic minorities have been
    regulated by a two-tier birth control policy that permits them to have more
    than one child.
    12
    Not surprisingly, members of various ethnic groups have
    since the 1980s invoked their non-Han origins to acquire rights and privileges
    afforded only to the officially recognized minorities.
    13
    Finally, the central government has adopted various measures to
    promote economic growth in areas with a large number of minority people,
    such as greater flexibility in local economic practices, increased state funding
    for local development projects, and more local control over the distribution of
    tax revenues in minority areas.
    14
    More importantly, the central government
    has pumped a large amount of cash into minority areas. For example, in
    1988, it contributed 44.7 per cent of the budget of the Guangxi Zhuang
    Autonomous Region government, 52.7 per cent of the budget of the Inner
    Mongolian Autonomous Region government, 60.1 per cent of the budget of
    the Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region government, 63.3 per cent of the
    budget of the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region government, and 99.8 per
    cent of the budget of the Xizang Autonomous Region government.
    15
    The
    central government’s financial support in the form of relief funds, direct
    subsidies, and tax relief has been a key factor for the well-being of the local
    populations in minority areas. For example, despite the fact that the level of
    socio-economic development in Tibet is substantially lower than that of China
    as a whole, in 1981, the annual average income of urban residents in Tibet was
    10
    Heberer,
    China and Its National Minorities
    , pp. 23-29; Bernard Henin, “Ethnic Minority
    Integration in China: Transformation of Akha Society.”
    Journal of Contemporary Asia
    26/2
    (1996): pp. 180-200; William R. Jankowiak,
    Sex, Death, and Hierarchy in A Chinese City
    (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).
    11
    Jankowiak,
    Sex, Death, and Hierarchy in a Chinese City
    , pp. 30-35.
    12
    Gladney,
    Ethnic Identity in China
    ; Jankowiak,
    Sex, Death, and Hierarchy in A Chinese
    City
    , p. 35.
    13
    Heberer
    China and Its National Minorities
    , pp. 78-89; Gladney,
    Ethnic Identity in China
    ;
    Wu, “Chinese Minority Policy”.
    14
    Gladney, “Economy and Ethnicity”, p. 244; Bernar Vincent Olivier,
    The Implementation
    of China’s Nationality Policy in the Northwestern Provinces
    (San Francisco: Mellen
    Research University Press, 1993).
    15
    Ma Rong,
    Population and Society in Tibet
    (Beijing: Tongxin Press, 1996), p. 218.
    Zhang and Li
    38
    137 RMB higher than that in whole China. This amount represented a
    substantial income difference at that time.
    16
    The situation has changed since economic reforms started in 1978.
    Data show that in 1997 the average annual disposable income of urban
    residents in Tibet was RMB 5,135, as compared to a national average of RMB
    5,160; the figures for 1998 were RMB 5,438 and RMB 5,425 respectively.
    17
    However, considering the huge gap in development levels between Tibet and
    China as a whole, one has to conclude that urban residents in Tibet have
    achieved income parity with urban residents in China mainly because of state
    financial support.
    Most experts have focused their attention on ethnic groups in officially
    designated minority areas in China.
    18
    In this research we examine an under-
    studied part of the minority population — members of ethnic groups who are
    scattered in urban areas where Han residents dominate. Chinese scholars
    believe that ethnic nationalities living outside minority areas numbered around
    18 million in the 1990s, which represents a quarter of the total minority
    population in China.
    19
    Judith Banister points out that many of them have
    found it expedient or necessary to blend in with and adapt to Han culture.
    “Especially susceptible are the estimated 10 million members of minority
    groups who live in densely settled areas scattered among the Han.”
    20
    Before
    discussing this minority group further, we briefly review the literature on
    ethnic stratification in China.
    Existing Studies of Ethnic Stratification in Urban China
    Existing studies show that the Chinese government has carried out an
    affirmative action policy because ethnic minorities have historically faced
    obstacles to status attainment, including geographic remoteness, poverty, and
    cultural and language barriers. Researchers believe that with certain
    exceptions, minority nationalities trail the ethnic Chinese population in a
    variety of socio-economic indicators.
    21
    Two frequently cited indicators are
    income and education. Researchers in Mainland China believe that the general
    educational attainment of minorities is lower than that of Han Chinese.
    Consequently, members of the minorities are concentrated in blue-collar
    occupations with low incomes. According to a survey conducted in Beijing in
    1988, the average monthly income of Hui residents in Niujie was 71.38 yuan,
    16
    Ma,
    Population and Society in Tibet
    , p. 240; Mackerras,
    China’s Minorities
    , pp. 200-205.
    17
    Statistical Bureau,
    China Economic Yearbook 1999
    (Beijing:China Statistical Press,
    1999), pp. 645, 921.
    18
    Gladney,
    Ethnic Identity in China
    ; Hansen,
    Lessons in Being Chinese
    ; Harrell (ed.),
    Cultural Encounters in China’s Ethnic Frontiers
    ; Mackerras,
    China’s Minorities
    ; Rudelson,
    Oasis Identities
    ;
    Wu, “Chinese Minority Policy”; Zhang and Wu, “Ethnic Conflict and
    Unity”.
    19
    Li Honglei, et al.,
    Nationality Work in Contemporary China
    , p. 239.
    20
    Judith Banister,
    China’s Changing Population
    (Stanford: Stanford University Press,
    1987), p. 319.
    21
    Hannum and Xie, “Ethnic Stratification in Northwest China,” p. 323; Mackerras,
    China’s
    Minorities
    .
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